Knightsbridge Asset Management, LLC

October 30, 2008

## Fall Commentary

"Present fears are less than horrible imaginings"

-William Shakespeare, 1564-1616 -English Playwright and Dramatist -MacBeth, Act 1, scene iii -MacBeth ruminating to himself

The S&P 500 lost a fifth of its value in the first ten days of October, and 28% through Friday the 24<sup>th</sup>. That's not year-to-date,




that's since most investors got their last monthly statement! At this rate of drop, the stock market should reach zero by January 15<sup>th</sup>, about the time our new President will be preparing his 'State of the Union' speech. And some state it is in. For anyone invested in the stock or bond markets, it seems Shakespeare must have been a cockeyed optimist as "present fears" appear to be much more than just "horrible imaginings"; rather, they have become "horrible realities".

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What investors have been subjected to in the past few weeks reads like a Kafka novel; disorienting, surreal and unlike anything previously experienced. Like dominoes falling one upon another within the financial system, Fed and Treasury have rushed to shore things up with equity infusions into banks, buying up of commercial paper, expansion of FDIC insurance, and money market fund asset purchases to prevent their "breaking the buck". All this, in addition to purchases of troubled mortgage paper from failing institutions, accelerated by the bankruptcy of Lehman Bros., the first time since the Great Depression that an institution with access to the Fed window defaulted on their bonds. Allowing the bankruptcy of Lehman is now widely seen

as a policy mistake in light of subsequent chaos and blowing-out of credit spreads. It was said this could not happen, but it did.



Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, earning the sobriquet "King Henry", went to Congress the last week in September to sell a three page plan, now known as TARP (Troubled Asset Recovery Plan). By the end of the week, a 730-page document had passed, replete with pork of every flavor. The nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the forced acquisitions of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, of Washington Mutual (and Bear Stearns) by J.P. Morgan and Wachovia by Wells Fargo as well as the failure of A.I.G. and the issuance of commercial bank charters to the two last remaining independent investment banking firms, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, set the stage for the market rout that followed. The CDS (credit default swap) market is in total disarray (think of credit default swaps as wagers that a particular company bond will or will not be able to pay its interest). Treasury's decision to try to put up a fence around the nine largest banks in the U.S. marked a turning point. Although not made public at the time, it now appears that the money being injected into these favored banks in the form of preferred stock purchases is intended to facilitate a series of shotgun weddings with lesser institutions. Possibly this is because FDIC funds are now down to \$45 billion which, for example, might have been inadequate in the case of Washington Mutual to take over an institution with a \$320 billion mortgage portfolio of dubious quality.


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Although perhaps too soon to declare victory, three widely watched indicators of system health have been showing improvement:

1) U.S. T-bill rates (we want to see their yields go higher which would indicate a lessening of a flight to quality),

2) LIBOR, an acronym for the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate, the rate at which banks lend to each other (we want to see these yields come down indicating banks are more willing to lend to one another), and,


3) the TED Spread, acronym for the Treasury Euro Dollar spread (we want to see this differential shrink).



Each seems to be going in the desired direction. Certainly, when the Fed brings out the howitzers and bazookas, one should not stand in the way. As seen above in charts by Strategas Research Partners, LIBOR rates are beginning to come down, and the TED spread is narrowing.

The Federal Reserve 'balance sheet', which is to say the assets owned by the Fed, has changed dramatically, almost doubling in

the past several weeks. Moreover, the agglomeration of assets owned by the Fed, which now includes mortgages, etc., is only 30% U.S. Treasury paper now whereas several weeks ago it was 90% U.S. Treasury paper. What the outcome of this bloating will be



down the road remains to be seen. The list of governmental actions taken so far in the month of October alone and the size of each commitment is illustrated by the Federal Reserve Balance Sheet on the previous page.

The central question for equity investors bludgeoned and shellshocked by events of the past month is whether the stock market has hit bottom ... "a" bottom or "the" bottom. Since there seem to be few or no historical precedents within memory to the current fiasco, we think investors need to look at some very long market history in order to capture as many data points as possible to draw appropriate conclusions.

S&P Index from 1825 through 2007	,	2007 2005 1994 1993 1993 1987 1988 1978 1970 1960 1956 1948 1947 1923 1947	2006 2004 1988 1986 1979 1975	Manage	: Value Squai ment, Yale U : years : 129 e years : 54 (	Iniversity (70%)		As can be seen here, so far in 2008, the decline is only matched by 1931, the worst year on record since 1825, a period of 183 years! This history takes
		1912	1971					-
	2000	1911 1906	1968 1965					in the collapse
	1981	1902	1964					of the currency
	1977	1899	1959					in 1842, the
	1969	1896	1952					civil war 1860-
	1962 1953	1895 1894	1949 1944	2003				
	1953	1894	1944	1999				1864 and
	1940	1889	1921	1998				subsequent
	1939	1887	1919	1996				inflation, then
	1934	1881	1918	1983				deflation, the
	1932	1877	1905	1982				-
2001	1929	1875 1874	1904 1898	1976 1967				banking panic
1973	1914	1872	1897	1967	1997			of 1907, WWI,
1957	1903	1871	1892	1961	1995			the crash of
1941	1890	1870	1886	1951	1991			1929, and more
1920	1887	1869	1878	1943	1989			•
1917	1883	1868	1864 1858	1942 1925	1985 1980			recent and
1893	1876	1866	1855	1925	1980			memorable
1884	1861	1865	1850	1922	1955			history.
1873	1860	1859	1849	1915	1950			Clearly the
2002 1854	1853	1856	1848	1909	1945			-
1974 1841	1851	1844	1847	1901	1938	1958	1954	history books
1930 1837 2008 1907 1831	1845	1842	1838 1834	1900 1880	1936 1927	1935 1928	1933 1885	will be talking
YTD 1857 1828	1833	1836	1832	1852	1908	1863	1879	about this one
1931 1937 1839 1825	1827	1826	1829	1846	1830	1843	1862	for many years
-50 to -40 -40 to -30 -30 to -20 -20 to -14	-10 to o	0 to 10	10 to 20	zo to 30	30 to 40	40 to 50	50 to 60	to come.

Percentage Total Return


Nor has the decline been confined to stocks. High- yield corporate bonds dropped 18% in the 40-day period from September 1<sup>st</sup> to October 9<sup>th</sup>. According to Martin Fridson of Fridson Investment Advisors, a drop of half this amount should happen only once every 27,000 years. Lucky us! Such a price drop is predictive of a quadrupling in default rates in the next year, from about 3% to some 12% according to Mr. Fridson. This is despite the non-financial sector cash/debt ratio being at a 48year high and non-financial debt/net worth ratio at a 38-year low.




The chart at left shows that whenever the tenyear return on the Dow Jones Industrial Average drops to only 2% per annum, the future returns move higher. The DJIA is presently about 8500, and was about 8500 in October of 1998, and dividend returns have been approximately 2%

through this period. Since no same person would invest money in the stock market over a period of ten years to achieve a return of only 2% per annum, such an extended period must culminate in profound investor disappointment. Conclusion: a buying opportunity seen only once every 40 years, or five times in 180 years going back to 1828!

Stock market volatility has hit extremes never before seen. The popular VIX index is an index of volatility. Heretofore, the highest volatility ever recorded, which is always occurring at market bottoms, was a VIX (3-day moving average) reading of 47...only to be eclipsed by the current read of 67.




Another bullish indicator is the amount of sidelined cash in money market funds as a percentage of equity market value. The chart below shows this cash at all-time highs.



However, the story is even more extreme than shown here as this data is as of September 30<sup>th</sup>, and the overall market has dropped at least 25% since then reducing the denominator of the fraction accordingly. Also, no adjustment has been made for the flight to direct purchases of T-bills which has even driven their yields negative on several occasions in the past two months. Therefore, with these two adjustments, the already highest reading ever, is even dramatically higher, possibly by as much as 35-40%. Previously the highest readings were in 1982 when T-bonds yielded 15% and T-bills double digit. The way this data should be viewed is "fuel for the next bull market". But then again, who is thinking in terms of the next bull market? No one.


Another indication extraordinary values may be upon us is the observation that 56% of the S&P 500 Index now has a P/E ratio below 10. Since this statistic is calculated using consensus earnings for each stock, naysayers might

## S&P 500: % of stocks < 10X PE NTM



Source: Factset


claim the earnings being used are too high. This is surely the case, but the conclusion is still valid since prior data points were created using the same flawed estimates being made at the time.



We all know intuitively that equity market sentiment must be at all-time lows. Nevertheless, it is always instructive to visually see

just how extreme it is. The chart above only goes back to 1995, but sentiment is the most negative it has ever been as seen here. Moreover, just today it was reported that the Conference Board Survey of consumer sentiment reached a reading of 38 for October, the lowest reading ever, and down from 61 in September, placing equity market and consumer sentiment in synch.

Yet another indication the fall in equity prices may have reached a proximate bottom is a measurement of how far the Dow Jones Industrial Average has gone below its 200-day moving average. This measure shows that as of October 10<sup>th</sup>, the DJIA was three standard deviations (3 sigma) below its 200-day moving average, a rare enough occurrence that it has happened only three times since 1937 (1974, 1987 and 2008).



Investors have been subjected to an emotional roller-coaster the likes of which are seen perhaps once or twice in a lifetime. No one would voluntarily submit to the type of financial torture all investors have experienced in the current malaise. Once again, unintended consequences have come into play, and one can only hope not to compound the present damage by taking wrong action at the wrong time. But temptations are great. We apologize to all our investors and constituency for having taken part in this drama, and are looking forward to days when volatility returns to more normal levels and investment returns are once again in the positive column.

Our experiences in October 2008 will not be soon forgotten. We are reminded of the poem written by William Ernest Henley in 1875 entitled "Invictus" (Latin for "Unconquered").

Out of the night that covers me, Black as the Pit from pole to pole, I thank whatever gods may be For my unconquerable soul.

In the fell clutch of circumstance I have not winced nor cried aloud Under the bludgeonings of chance My head is bloody, but unbowed

Beyond this place of wrath and tears Looms but the horror of the shade And yet the menace of the years Finds, and shall find me, unafraid

It matters not how strait the gate, How charged with punishments the scroll I am the master of my fate; I am the captain of my soul.

Very truly yours,

Alan T. Beimfohr

John G. Prichard, CFA

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